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Kundry must die – stage direction and authenticity 
 
 
 In Nikolaus Lehnhoff production of Richard Wagner’s Parsifal (English National 
Opera, 1999), the character of Kundry didn’t die at the end of the third act “lifelessly 
sinking to the ground in front of Parsifal” as mandated by Wagner himself. Instead, she 
overcomes the “unnatural” separation between men and women and leads Parsifal and 
the other surviving knights away from the castle of the Grail. Despite its being highly 
thought provoking and quite consequential with the overall philosophical re-
interpretation of the drama by Lehnhoff, this change is nonetheless a betrayal of 
Wagner’s specific instructions.  
Some recent bibliography has questioned the merits and indeed the ethics of 
stage productions that deviate from the original to the point that the work is no longer 
recognisable as such. 1   There even seems to be a blatant contradiction in the case of 
opera productions where extreme care is placed upon philological fidelity in the 
orchestra pit – in the spirit of historical authenticity - while at the same time a radical 
reinterpretation of plot and historical context is pursued on stage. Some arguments have 
been produced against extreme liberality in stage direction and, more specifically, in 
opera. First, that it subscribes to an obsolete metaphysics of being and appearance. Ever 
since Patrice Chéreau’s revolutionary staging of Wagner’s Ring in Bayreuth (1976) a trend 
has been set of dressing up characters in unexpected costumes with the intent of 
displacing them, and indeed the whole plot, from their original cultural ethos. Applied to 
costumes and sets and the overall social and cultural environment, this “updating” is 
nowadays pretty much the standard in opera production. Detractors of this stylistic 
option have argued that this trend is rooted in a misguided metaphysics by considering 
that whatever the appearance of the character, its “essence” remains the same, and they 
counter argue that in theatre appearance is the essence. If you change the first, you 
corrupt the latter because basically “underneath the appearances of Tartufe, Wotan, 
Falstaff or Don Giovanni there is nothing and no one. These characters are to their 
complete extent their own appearances and nothing other”.2 A related criticism argues 
that the interpreters compelled to collaborate with this “wrong metaphysics” and the 
																																																								
1 Cf. Catteau, 2012: 15. 
2 Catteau, 2012: 52. 
radicalism of at least some of these choices can no longer believe in their roles, resulting 
in disenchanted and mediocre representations. 3 
Second, that this kind of stage production derives from prejudice and ignorance 
regarding different epochs other than the contemporary, which ultimately explains the 
obsessive need to “update” costumes, settings and behaviours. Third, that it fosters a 
kind of nullification of what is intrinsically external to our culture, namely by producing 
“politically correct” versions of what is ultimately incorrigible. In this paper these two 
objections will be synthesized under a broader criticism, namely the one that argues for 
the need to respect the original work, the author’s intentional agenda and the 
idiosyncrasies of its time of inception in order to produce an authentic instance of the 
work. A fourth objection declares that this trend in opera production is the by-product 
of a theatrical culture where the role of the producer has been over-emphasized. This 
fourth objection is also related to questions regarding the definition of authentic 
performance. Ultimately, there is a moral choice to be made: either we admit to challenge 
the author’s instructions or we limit the producer’s creativity.4 This moral choice is also 
entrenched in the on-going debate about the definition of “performance” opposing the 
defenders of performance-qua-interpretation (Wollheim, Carroll) and those who argue in 
favour of performance-qua-production (Saltz, Osipovich and, more remotely, Rorty and 
Fish). 
Although I’m intuitively inclined to accept the priority of production, there is 
much to consider in the arguments of more conservative accounts. This is what this 
paper proposes, a panoramic view of what should count as proper performance of a 
notational dramatic text. In order to do that, I’ll be juggling with two different kinds of 
materials. On the one hand, the arguments with which philosophers of music, in 
particular, have tried to define what should count as “correct” performance. On the 
other hand, the philosophical discussion about what a theatrical performance is 
(descriptively as well as normatively). At the intersection of both lines of thought we 
expect to find some illumination as to whether Kundry should live or die. 
 
1. Kundry must die!: the identity of dramatic works 
 
																																																								
3 “Comment Cassandre peut-elle invoquer l’ombre d’Hector avec son bonnet de la Croix Rouge sur la 
tête?”, Catteau, 2012: 16. 
4 Cf. Kidnie, 2009 
Opponents of radicalism in theatre and opera have argued that “appearance” is 
the essence of a theatrical production and that by changing the former one is actually 
corrupting the latter. “Appearance” encompasses not only the costumes and the 
scenographic environment but also the specific plot and conniving that surrounds the 
cultural framework that surrounds the characters “in a given time and place”, motivating 
their sets of beliefs and desires properly immersed in that hic et nunc, including the 
historical contingencies of her time. One cannot update a character – e.g. Don Giovanni 
turned drug dealer in New York, as in Peter Sellars celebrated version - and expect this 
network of meaningful characterizations to remain intact. And if the appearance is 
subverted, the essence is lost: “Don Giovanni, the trader, seduces but no longer defies 
religious beliefs; from then on, to avenge the dead and to appeal to the justice of God are 
no longer verisimilar because today’s seducers have nothing to fear”.5 Their proper 
costumes literally contain their dramas and their eras in an inextricable way and should 
therefore be preserved as conditions of meaning and dramatic identity. 
But how exactly should we distinguish what elements of the characters’ 
appearance are indeed part of their essence? For instance, is Aeneas in Berlioz’ Les 
Troyens more meaningfully portrayed as a historically accurate (according to 
contemporary criteria) Trojan soldier or rather as the idea of what Berlioz believed to be 
the accurate characterization of a Trojan soldier? Isn’t it at least arguable that a more 
archaeological minded contemporary presentation of Aeneas could also be perceived as 
severing some of the traits that we find in Berlioz’s work? After all, from what we now 
know, Greek and Trojan societies were much less exuberant than what we can infer from 
Berlioz’s plot and music. A trimmed down Aeneas is a more truthful one? And where lies 
the boundary between the character’s being and mere pastiche? 
 
a) Autographic / Allographic 
 
Let us go back for a second just to recall what are arguably the two most 
operative contemporary ways of establishing the identity of a dramatic work in text and 
performance: Nelson Goodman’s allographic / autographic art distinction and Richard 
Wollheim’s type-token ontology. According to Goodman, autographic artworks are fully 
determined by their history of production and so every detail of the work is constitutive 
of its identity (painting, sculpture, etchings); by contrast the identity of allographic 																																																								
5 Catteau, 2012: 54. 
artworks can be fully preserved in notational form, which means that any accurately 
“spelled” copy of the allographic work is the work. 
Goodman’s theory has the advantage of fully acknowledging that in dramatic art 
the work is located in the performance itself and that performance is not merely an add-
on to the text.6 However, what could count as a performance of the work is highly 
restricted since only those performances that comply with the text are genuine. Since 
accuracy is of the essence, this leads to some strange consequences, some of which are 
perfectly admitted by Goodman himself: 
“Since complete compliance with the score is the only requirement for a 
genuine instance of a work, the most miserable performance without actual mistakes 
does count as such an instance, while the most brilliant performance with a single wrong 
note does not.”7 
 
Although admitting that the brilliant pianist who inadvertently has failed a couple 
of notes during her performance may have produced a more aesthetically satisfying 
version of the sonata than the mediocre student who carefully hits every note, still the 
former doesn’t count as an instance of the work. Also, the many questions that have 
been raised – namely by musicologists - against Goodman’s notion of “correct” script 
have shown that this constitutes at least a problematic way of defining the proper 
ontology of performative arts. 
 
b) Types and tokens 
 
In this respect, Wollheim’s adaptation of Peirce’s type-token theory seems to 
constitute a safer bet than Goodman’s. Works of literature and performance are not 
“objects” because there is no corresponding physical entity. Instead the object is a token 
of a type (respectively, my copy of Ulysses and Joyce’s manuscript; tonight’s performance 
of Der Rosenkavalier and Strauss’s handwritten score). 8  This entails two important 
consequences: 
i) That any property of the token which is not simply a consequence 
of the token’s material existence (e.g., Waltraud Meier’s height or Christopher 
Ventris’ voice colour in Lehnhoff’s Parsifal) may be transmitted from the 
token to its type. This prevents Wollheim’s notion of type to become a kind 																																																								
6 Cf. Kidnie, 2009: 15. 
7 Goodman, 1976: 186. 
8 Wollheim, 1980: 75. 
of Platonic ideal form and although the type is immaterial we may still speak 
of it as having physical properties (imported from the token): “There is 
nothing that prevents us from saying that Donne’s Satires are harsh on the 
ear, or that Dürer’s engraving of St Anthony has a different texture, or that the 
conclusion of ‘Celeste Aida’ is pianissimo.”9 Significantly, in the case of the 
performative arts there are many properties of the token that will not be 
transmitted to the type. They are “in excess” of the type and constitute the 
“element of interpretation” which will shape different performances of the 
same work. A difficulty here is that it is impossible to tell apart the “element 
of interpretation” from those properties that will be shared with the type. 
Wollheim describes this as a chicken-egg problem: without prior knowledge 
of the “Ideal” work we cannot determine what is essential to either type or 
token. Therefore we cannot determine whether a particular token is 
“genuine” or even whether two or more particulars are tokens of the same 
type.10 As we shall try to demonstrate a bit later, one way to solve the 
chicken-egg problem is to think of the relation between token and type as a 
kind of reflective equilibrium, a continuous shuttle between the dramatic and 
the literary works. 
 
ii) This provides the basis for Wollheim’s thesis – presently most 
prominently defended by Noël Carroll - according to which each performance is 
an interpretation of a play. This thesis has faced some important contemporary 
opposition (David Saltz, David Osipovich) arguing in favour of the primacy of 
production and denying that the relationship between play and performance is 
one of interpretation.11  
 
The notion that to play a role involves interpretation is already imbedded in many 
languages. In French, Italian, Spanish or Portuguese, for instance, one can use 
interchangeably that someone is playing (jouer, jugar, actuar) or that she is interpreting 
(interpréter / interpretar) a role. Wollheim acknowledges this analogy and argues against 
the eliminability of interpretation in the performing arts. He compares what he calls 																																																								
9 Wollheim, 1980: 82. 
10 Cf. Kidnie, 2009: 18. 
11 “Stage direction [‘mise en scène’] is no longer conceived here as the transfer of one text into a 
representation, but rather as the scenic production by which an author (the stage director) has all the 
authority and permission to give form and meaning to the whole performance.” (Pavis, 1996)  
“performative interpretation” – what musicians or players do - with “critical 
interpretation” the activity of art critics or scholars. “It is, I suggest, no coincidence that 
this activity, of taking the poem or painting or novel in one way rather than another, is 
also called interpretation.”12 The object of interpretation is always the text – musical or 
literary – and even when we take a performance to be the object for interpretation we are 
not concerned with the meanings suggested by the performance but rather with the 
“critical interpretations” of the play implicit in the performance, which is fully 
paraphraseable. When we interpret a performance, sustains Wollheim, we are always 
considering possible alternative performances, which would present the original text in a 
different way: “we are not suggesting or arguing for alternative ways in which the actual performance 
might be taken. Our interpretation is on the occasion of a performance, not about it”.13 
The obvious outcome is that the performance is perceived as a mere looking glass 
because the audience “reads through the performance to the play”.14 This clarifies the 
parallel between the pair work-critical essay and the pair play-performance. 
 
c) Plays and recipes 
 
Noël Carroll has presented a weaker version of Interpretationism by using 
“interpretation” in a different sense: instead of comparing performances to critical 
assessments (as Wollheim does), he compares them to culinary achievements: 
performative interpretations are like the filling of a recipe. 15  There is however an 
important difference between the two philosophers. For Wollheim, interpretation was 
the real function of performances: they provide occasions for interpreting the play and 
the play remains the focus of the spectator’s attention (in a way, Kundry is already dead 
even, or especially, if she survives). Carroll, on the other hand, remains silent about the 
spectator’s real focus of attention.16  
Still, Carroll’s version also has its problems. First, because the metaphor may be 
taken the other way around: two similar interpretations of a “recipe” may lead to two 
very different executions: as Saltz puts it, when preparing an apple pie I use Granny 
Smith apples while the recipe suggested Roma apples. In fact, the performer’s 
interpretation of the meaning of the play is an interim stage of the production and may 																																																								
12 Wollheim, 1980: 84. 
13 Wollheim, 1980: 85. 
14 Saltz, 2001: 299. 
15 Cf. Carroll 2001, 2006. 
16 Saltz, 2001: 302. 
very well be compared to the cook’s interpreting the meaning of the recipe. But 
afterwards, actors and producers move on to make a series of choices that “are 
consistent with their interpretation” (Saltz, 2001: 303) and there is no reason to call these 
choices as interpretations. Second, because to accept the analogy between performance 
and cooking may very well lead us in quite the opposite direction as the one prescribed 
by Carroll: as the goal of cooking is not to “be true to the recipe” but to prepare a good 
meal (one that will be evaluated on its own terms) so too the goal of a performance is to 
produce an engaging and aesthetically satisfactory experience: thus, the spectator very 
seldom perceives the aesthetic object as being distinct from the production.17 Third, 
apple pies are the products of the recipe; but dramatic performances are the execution of 
a play, they are constituted by the act itself of saying the lines and following the stage 
directions. The way an actor follows the play’s instructions is aesthetically relevant but 
the way a cook follows a recipe is not important, i.e., the way she chooses to execute the 
recipe doesn’t matter. 
What this all shows is that the difference between recipes and performances is 
not to be found in the intrinsic properties of the type (plays or recipes) or of the activities 
involved in following the respective instructions but “simply in the audience’s 
perception”. 18 
Still, although a contemporary shift from interpretation to production seems to 
constitute an effective way to reply agains those who complain about directors who drift 
away from the text – see section 3 below -, the decision whether Kundry should live or 
die cannot be simply answered as constituting a pure production option. Kundry’s 
survival is far more disruptive than D. Giovanni’s change of profession or Fidelio’s 
playing Gameboy in prison. To return to Wollheim’s type-token model, it clearly 
epitomizes a philosophical twist in the overall meaning of the original plot and is thus 
one those properties that can be transmitted to the type. Even in Saltz’s model, it is an 
option taken at the interpretative interim stage. Therefore, it raises other questions 
concerning the limits of interpretation and the distinction between a proper instance of 
the work (a compliant instance, in Goodmanian terms) and an adaptation. To follow this 
we now turn to the way the question has been tackled by philosophers of music. 
 
d) Intentionalist authenticity 
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 The discussion surrounding the notion of authentic musical performance is 
extremely diverse and we could list the presence of at least four major arguments in 
favour of historically controlled performances: the intentional, the sonic, the practical and 
the phenomenological.19 In view of our problem I shall concentrate on the notion of 
intentionalist authenticity and hopefully withdraw some criteria to measure the extent to 
which we are we conditioned by the author’s plot or didascalia: must Kundry die? 
The “intentionalist” argument holds that historically minded performances are 
the best way to carry out the author’s intentions and that to follow these instructions is 
both an ethic and an aesthetic duty. Some authors distinguish between “strong 
intentions” (those that must be carried out in order for the performance to comply as 
performance of that work) and “weak intentions” (those that are to some extent 
discardable or negligible) and the question emerges as to what could count as a weak 
intention. For instance, when we consider those works whose libretti and didascalia were 
written down by the composer himself (e.g., Berlioz or Wagner) could stage directions be 
considered part of the “weaker intentions” group? 
Intentionalists like to invoke the argument of analyticity that holds that being true 
to the manifestations of the author is integral to the very notion of what it is to perform 
a musical work. On ethical terms, being true to the composer’s intentions can easily be 
seen as a duty not only towards the composer herself but also towards the audience. On 
aesthetic terms, it is argued that being true to the composer’s intentions is at least a safe 
bet towards attaining a good and aesthetically more rewarding performance. 
Naturally, any mentioning of “intentions” brings along the charge of “intentional 
fallacy”. Determining the author’s intentions vis-à-vis the performance is often difficult 
to accomplish although it is also true that in many cases we already hold reliable 																																																								
19 First, the “intentionalist” argument that holds that historically minded performances are the best way to 
carry out the author’s intentions and that to follow these instructions is both an ethic and an aesthetic duty. 
Secondly, the “sonic” argument: performers should try to come as close as possible to the original sonic 
experience of the work. Thirdly, the “practical” argument: the replication of the past sonic, or dramatic, 
event is not exactly the goal of musical performance but it should nonetheless be undertaken according to 
the original modes or practices. And finally there is the “phenomenological” argument according to which 
the performance truthfulness lies on the ability to reproduce the experience of the original piece by trying 
to accomplish an object similar to the one experienced by the initial audience. This last proposal is much 
more flexible when it comes to define the range of what correct performances could be like but it poses 
nonetheless some intriguing questions. For instance, if properties such as “surprising”, “original” and 
“daring” were historically attributed to the work in its original context, then they must have produced an 
experience characterized by “surprise”, “perplexity” or even “outrageousness”. What would then count as 
a phenomenologically correct performance of that work? Would this not ultimately justify the kind of 
theatrical “audacities” that many find so objectionable?  Much of this discussion regarding the concept of 
correct performance is specific to music, particularly in the case of arguments two and three. 
information that would eventually bring forth the author’s intentions. For instance, the 
original 1882 settings of Parsifal, as authorized by Wagner himself, were only destroyed in 
the 1930’s and there are enough photographic documents that could justify an 
archaeological performance of the work. 
Of course, Beardsley and Wimsatt’s don’t object to the recognition of intentions 
in the work but rather to the relevance of the author’s intentions outside the work, and 
namely that these external intentions are necessary to establish the content and meaning 
of the work – the need to “consult the oracle”, as they put it. Strictu sensu, the “intentional 
fallacy” affects this esoteric kind of intentions and not the explicit intentions in the work. 
But even if we take for granted that we can reach a reasonable insight of the 
author’s intentional agenda stashed within the work, particularly regarding the different 
ways of performing her works, we have to acknowledge that intentions are not all the 
same and that they have different degrees of importance. Randall Dipert has 
distinguished 3 levels of musical intentions. First, low-level intentions, which include the 
choice of instruments, the fingering, etc. Second, middle-level intentions, which are those 
that relate to the intended sound: “temperament, timbre, attack, pitch, and vibrato”. And 
third, high-level intentions, “which are the effects the composer intends to produce in 
the listener”. Significantly, these intentions are sometimes incompatible among 
themselves and one of the tasks of the performer is to decide what level should be 
granted more weight, assuming that high-level intentions usually take precedence. For 
instance, in the third number of the Magnificat in D, Bach’s low-level intention was to use 
the oboe d’amore of his day in order to produce a given tone quality (middle-level 
intention) and thus to achieve an expressive effect on his audience (high-level intention).  
“But that tone and quality and, hence, the effect Bach wanted, might be better 
achieved today, given the conditions of modern musical performance, by the 
modern French oboe d’amore (…). That being the case, we cannot serve 
Bach’s middle – and high-level intentions most fully without going against his 
low-level ones”20 
Two consecutive problems arise in this respect: first, that it is not always easy to 
distinguish between strong and weak intentions, i.e., those that determine what a correct 
performance of a given work should be like and those that are merely presented as 
advices or recommendations. Second, that many times the intentions are not fully 
consistent with each other if not altogether contradictory among themselves. The 
problems with distinguishing strong and weak intentions are even more complicated in 																																																								
20 Kivy, 1988: 225. 
the case of opera if we inscribe stage directions, settings and didascalia in the author’s 
intentional agenda. One could imagine that Wagner’s highest-level intention in Parsifal 
was to celebrate a dying cultural ethos, one that his audience would relate to and feel 
threatened by, say, a commoditized society. To forsake earthly love – through the 
alienation of women - and adopt a mystical connection to the universe was part of that 
ethos’ set of values. To this time and age this message seems exhausted and doesn’t seem 
likely to appeal to an informed audience. A renewed bond between Parsifal and Kundry 
– instead of her suppression -, at the end of the opera, does seem to set a more universal 
tone and indeed an Aufhebung of Wagner’s own over sexualized views. It also has the 
interesting consequence of enhancing the serenity and all-embracing quality of much of 
this opera’s music (or at least, of removing one serious moral obstacle to its enjoyment) 
and thus reinforce a high-level musical intention.  
This question leads to a second problem. In cases where the intentional agenda 
of the author is not fully consistent, can we still talk about intentionalist authenticity? 
Lower-level intentions are usually more accessible than higher-level intentions. But if in 
order to fulfil the majority of the author’s intentions one sacrifices some higher-level 
intention, that does not seem very authentic (that is why many historic-oriented 
performers follow the more safe and explicit lower-level intentions and neglect middle 
and high level ones). Again, the case gets worse if we are talking about stage direction. 
 There are other reasons by which intentions can become incompatible among 
themselves. With time, a given network of intentions may loose its consistency and lead 
to performances that are no longer pleasing. For instance, the surprise effect of using 
exotic instruments, such as early uses of the clarinet in works by Handel, Vivaldi or 
Rameau, has long ceased to exist given the vulgarization of the use of that instrument. 
Thus, a first level intention is now incompatible with a third level intention. If 
circumstances may alter the success of certain intentions, then it seems reasonable to 
argue that it is impossible for the composer to have full knowledge of what will work 
better for future performances of her work. In this sense, the substitution of the clarinet 
for a more exotic instrument – considering today’s expectations -, the fashionable update 
of D. Giovanni’s costumes or Kundry’s survival may very well become ways of better 
attaining the composer’s higher intentions. 
 Defenders of intentionalist authenticity could reply in two ways: 1) there is not 
such thing as higher intentions; 2) lower level intentions are never incompatible with 
higher level intentions, at least not in a definitive way. The first reply sustains that if 
higher intentions did exist then composers would be willing to sacrifice performative 
instructions for anything that would cause the intended effects in the minds of the 
listener.21 The only relevant higher-level intention would be that the audience hears a 
performance that satisfies the middle level intentions, i.e., the prescribed sonic 
experience. But this seems to apply only to a limited number of musical works, namely 
those that are somehow affiliated with the idea of artworks as autonomous, formal 
aesthetic works. For many others, the arousal of emotions in the audience was clearly an 
essential intention of the work – and this was definitely the case with Parsifal.  
According to the second reply, the cultivated listener will always be able to adapt 
herself to the original conditions and will resist falling into the temptation of neglecting 
the work’s Zeitgeist. This suggests, of course, that one may always “return” to a set of 
expectations that will fulfil the higher intentions leaving intact the lower ones. However, 
this seems to imply, for instance, that harpsichords or lutes would somehow loose their 
antiquated aura and be again heard as natural and popular instruments and that modern 
audiences would always be able to revive the original hearing conditions, always 
corresponding to the higher intentions without changes in the lower intentions. And this 
is not plausible. 
 
e) A fine and delicate balance 
 
It is a historical fact that most operas were conceived as ontologically flexible. It is 
doubtful that Haendel or Donizetti conceived the first versions of their respective operas 
as constituting the definite work. They were rather conceived as recipes that could 
undergo changes in view of circumstantial demands. Wagner changed many segments of 
Tristan und Isolde during rehearsals in order to adapt to the conditions of its first 
performance – particularly because of the problems the original score presented to his 
own choice of singers. The same happened with Meyerbeer’s The Prophet with the 
composer ending up by preferring the “altered” version. All these cases present 
important exceptions to considering the composer’s original work as a repository of 
sovereign intentions, an Urtext never to be defied. 
Nevertheless, many critics hold that works of art are like organic entities and that 
any change in details will compromise the whole. The axiom of delicate balance could be 
traced back to Aristotle’s Poetics (51a) when he compares a well-crafted tragedy to a living 																																																								
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organism. Any alteration of one of its elements alters the whole. Of course, this 
organicity is perceived as a characteristic of fine works of art and an essential criterion 
for distinguishing between better works and lesser pieces. This implies that respecting 
the full agenda of intentions of an artwork is only commendable in the case of works 
that present a very high level of organic interdependence. This introduces some relativity 
in the axiom because the obligation to comply with the composer’s full agenda of 
intentions depends upon the degree of organicity presented by the work. Since not every 
musical work adhere to the axiom then, at least for works that don’t adhere, one cannot 
sustain that the alteration of an element will necessarily produce an inferior version of 
the whole. 
Peter Kivy extends his discussion of the axiom by considering two meanings of 
delicate balance: the objective and the impressionistic. The first states that any minute 
change of the work’s elements jeopardizes its cohesion and quality. The second argues 
that perfect balance is more an impression induced in the spectator and can 
accommodate certain changes within reasonable boundaries. The first being overly 
ambitious and demanding, it is the second meaning that better corresponds to the spirit 
of the axiom. However, this second version does not correspond to the spirit of 
intentionalist authenticity since it does not validate the fact that the author’s intentions 
should be maintained at all cost. And if that sense of completeness and coherence can be 
attained without a careful preservation of those intentions, then the burden of proof is 
passed onto the defender of intentional authenticity: she now has to demonstrate that 
respecting the author’s intentions always and necessarily result in aesthetically more 
pleasing performances of the work. Kivy seems right in arguing that we cannot rule out 
that “disrespectful” performances may have other aesthetic merits – like that of 
constituting an original ontophany for the spectator, who is then able to repeat the 
experience of discovery of the original spectators - and thus be at least equally 
aesthetically rewarding. 
The axiom of delicate balance also seems to vary according to the artistic 
excellence of the composers. It is far more plausible to believe that alterations introduced 
in the staging of a Wagner opera will produce an inferior work than to believe it would 
also be necessarily the case with a work by Donizetti. But even in the case of undisputed 
masterpieces this axiom should not be perceived as universal truth. Kivy compares the 
axiom to Leibniz’s theodicy (Kivy, 1995: 171-173): the work performed according to the 
axiom of delicate balance is comparable to the best of all possible worlds. Just like 
Leibniz, its proponent wants us to accept it a priori, i.e., independently of the actual 
results of performing the work according to the author’s intentions. Just like tokens of 
earthly misery and sufferance will not affect the fact that this is the best possible world 
(the global outcome, from a divine perspective, will always be in toto better than the 
alternatives) so mediocre performances that result from strict obedience to the author’s 
intentions won’t suffice to show that this is not the best way of performing the work. 
Consider again our previous line of reasoning. Kundry’s not dying at the end is a 
way of stressing the universal appeal of Parsifal in a secularized and far less sexualized 
society than Wagner’s. Arguably, to the ears of contemporary audiences, it intensifies 
some important aesthetic properties of the music, like its serenity and equanimity.22 The 
defender of the axiom could characterize this as an illusion resulting from a lack of 
familiarity with the opera as a whole. A return to the original script will suffice to show 
that the author’s recipe is always the best option. And even if the great majority of 
contemporary operagoers would prefer the updated version, still it would be possible to 
defend that from an overall, superior, far more general perspective – one that is 
eventually impossible to fully grasp, such as Leibniz’s God view – the accepted 
alterations jeopardize the whole. One is the left with an epistemological choice: do we 
accept a priori reasons for sustaining that the author’s choices are always the best, à la 
Leibniz, or do we place all choices in the “trial of experience” (Kivy) and accept only 
those that receive a positive verdict?  
 
2. Should Kundry die? : performative counterfactualism 
 
Some detractors of intentional authenticity, such as Peter Kivy, hold that 
intentions are a function of what is available to the composer at the time when she wrote 
the piece. If the frame of possibilities were different - say, broader - would she have 
made the same choices? Counterfactually, it is always possible – if not desirable – to 
think what the composer would intend given the present range of possibilities. If we 
adopt a strict intentionalist view and try and follow the author’s options exactly as she 
has intended them in the original context, we lack precisely the knowledge of the 
circumstances and availability of options that have determined those intentions – and 
therefore one can hardly speak of understanding the author’s intentions. On the other 
																																																								
22 This echoes the arguments of ethicists according to which the subtraction of any ethical flaw in an 
artwork would also increment the work’s aesthetic appeal. 
hand, if we adopt a counterfactual view and try to imagine what would the author want 
given the current set of possibilities we may find ourselves barred from inferring an 
updated set of intentions given all the overwhelming and perplexing questions that arise 
out of the temporal and cultural distance between the composer’s time and our own. 
Peter Kivy thinks that counterfactualism is simply a question of using a basic rule 
for inferring the intentions of other people and that these are always relative to the 
options available. This inference is sometimes a test to our knowledge of others and our 
awareness of their innermost desires: Wanda wishes to be a nurse but we know that, if 
her family’s financial status would change, she would rather be a medical doctor, even if 
she had never expressed that desire before. In the case of composers of the past, our inference 
powers face the challenge of historic and cultural difference. If William, the man born in 
Bristol in 1769, chose to be a sailor when the alternative was to be a blacksmith, one can 
infer that, had he been born in 1991, he would probably choose a relatively challenging 
and adventurous profession, such as pilot or astronaut (not sailor, much less challenging 
and adventurous now that in the XVIII century). Basically, what Kivy shows is that some 
of the counterfactual questions, in particular those that assist us in projecting intentions 
from the past into the present, are fully intelligible and many find plausible answers. This 
implies that to literally follow the author’s intentions only becomes the default position 
when historic and cultural differences make it impossible to come up with reasonable 
questions and / or plausible answers. Still, Kivy argues that, even the hard cases (“must 
Kundry die?”), one can still reach some intelligible and answerable questions.  
Some authors argue that this counterfactual updating of intentions is as absurd as 
asking whether I would like Wagner if I were a penguin: nothing could be me and be a 
penguin and nothing could be Bach and live today.23  However, it seems right to consider 
that counterfactuals do have different degrees of plausibility: it is less implausible to 
imagine Bach being teleported to the XXI century than to imagine an entity that would 
be me and a penguin. Other authors argue that it is wrong to imagine that if, for instance, 
Bach would still be alive today he would still be interested in the music he wrote more 
than 250 years ago or that, considering all the options available today, he would still be 
writing the same kind of music.24 The counterfactualist replies that the options available 
to our hypothetical Bach are restricted to the fact that we are considering how to 
perform his works today.25  																																																								
23 Young, 1996: 198. 
24 Butt, 2002: 77. 
25 Lopes, 2010: 245. 
A third objection against counterfactualism accepts that many counterfactual 
questions are indeed intelligible and suggest reasonable answers but that it is also 
counterfactually reasonable to assume that authors would nevertheless hold on to their 
initial options. Kivy replies that from the fact that an author has intended something in 
accordance with her context of available options and conditions does not follow that she 
would intend exactly the same thing given our current context – the context changes the 
intentional path. Also, a composer’s high-level intentions should always be taken as a 
basis for inferring what she would want in the present context, and nothing can replace that 
inference. To ignore this is indeed a case of historic inauthenticity.     
Other opponents to counterfactualism (like Stephen Davies) accept that it is 
plausible that composers could engage on some kind of counterfactualism but suggest 
that they would nevertheless prefer the original options. Counterfactualism, of course, 
suggests otherwise. Intentions are related to the available set of options. If we 
counterfactually increase the range of those options we also increase the basis for a 
careful discussion of what would work better in the present circumstances. This works as 
a kind of reflective balance by which we compare the way the composer worked within 
her given set of options with the widened contemporary set of options. The composer’s 
choices act as a focuser assisting in the task of choosing the best available options; it is a 
way of seeing our objective in the distance. It is not so much a question of asking 
whether the composer would “prefer” a more contemporary reading but rather whether 
she would agree with its terms. To use a musical metaphor, this way of thinking about 
the interpretation of works is a kind of transcription. And if changes in instrumentation, 
pace or rubato in order to adjust to different acoustic environments constitute a 
common practice within that kind of reflective equilibrium, why should staging 
instructions be more rigid and inflexible?  
This leads to the question of how far can we go in entertaining different options 
before we start messing with the very identity of the work.26 It could be said that beyond 
a certain point the new intentions of a composer are no longer intentions about the 
performance of the work but are rather constitutive of a new version or a new work 
altogether. Naturally, this objection is supported by an ontology of musical works that 
stipulates a rather strict pattern of tolerance and inflexible conditions of compliance with 
the original work. Of course, it is easier to deflect this kind of objections if we are talking 
about musical options in which case it is rather easy to agree on reasonable limits of 																																																								
26 Davies, 2001: 223-224. 
tolerance (one could choose to play a given line written by Bach for an oboe d’amore by 
a cor anglais but not by a trumpet, for instance27). It is rather more difficult to accept that 
the fact that Kundry doesn’t die at the end of Parsifal does not affect the identity of the 
work, its “delicate balance”.  
Counterfactualism is indeed a powerful breakthrough in considering the work’s 
“authenticity”. Nevertheless, all things considered, counterfactualism still remains a way 
of acknowledging the author as the supreme authority albeit in a mitigated way. It’s all 
about the performer’s ability to engage on a kind of “theory of mind” with the author at 
its centre. Its difference vis-à-vis intentionalism is not one of nature but of the degree. 
What happens then if we turn our back to the author? 
 
3. Kundry may live : A reflective equilibrium 
 
Against the ontology of dramatic works proposed by philosophers such as 
Goodman, Wollheim or Carroll, recent authors such as David Saltz, David Osipovich or 
Margaret Kidnie have tried to show that mere “interpretation” is not sufficient to 
describe the relationship between a literary play and its performances. For one, the 
parallel Wollheim establishes between critical accounts and dramatic performances 
doesn’t hold. The concept of “interpretation” really seems to exhaust the relationship 
between a critical assessment of, say, Pelléas et Mélisande, and the play Pelléas et Mélisande: if 
something is a critical assessment and interprets Pelléas et Mélisande  it can only be a critical 
assessment of Pelléas et Mélisande. However, the fact that something is a performance and 
interprets Pelléas et Mélisande is not sufficient to make it a performance of Maeterlinck’s 
play. 28  Musical poems by Sibelius or Schönberg are both performances and 
interpretations of the play, and David Saltz would also argue that a lecture on Pelléas et 
Mélisande is a kind of performance but not a performance of Pelléas et Mélisande.29  Also, it 
is often when the elements of the performance depart more radically from the text being 
“interpreted” that the spectator becomes aware of the performance as functioning 
“effectively and unambiguously” as an interpretation. 
Consequently, it is denied that the immediate type of a performance is an 
interpretation and it is proposed instead that it is rather a production. This paradigm shift 
																																																								
27 Lopes, 2010: 255. 
28 Saltz, 2001: 300. 
29 Saltz, 2001: 300. 
turns theatrical experience less centred on an “allographic” object but rather based on 
the “autographic” instant of production.    
Saltz and Osipovich seem to be closer to a description of the phenomenology of 
the theatrical spectator, who is more involved with the production than attentive to the 
text - Saltz goes even so far as to add that “watching-for-the-play” (i.e., looking for the 
interpretation) only manages to describe the idiosyncratic experience of the drama critic, 
not that of the common spectator. However, this reference to the phenomenology of 
spectators may easily backfire. We may accept that the circumstantial spectator may be 
focused entirely on the production values but it also seems right to assume that the more 
common and moderately cultivated spectator is involved with a more or less conscious 
shuttle between the current production, previous productions and knowledge of the text. 
This could be described, again, as a kind of reflective equilibrium. The text retains its 
heuristic character above the causal connection between production and play and 
suggests a different way to think about the dramatic object. 
One way to perceive that a simple exclusively disjunctive option between 
interpretation and production is wrong is also grounded in the spectator’s 
phenomenology. There is a kind of Oedipus effect or self-contradiction involved in 
pursuing either option. A super radical production may very well trigger in the audience a 
kind of première feeling in which awareness of the text becomes prominent (it is, after 
all, the spectator’s main reference and her lifejacket in tormented waters), and therefore 
appear as oddly authentic. A hyper-conservative and respectful production may appear 
strangely anachronistic and pastiche-like with production options obstructing a clear 
connection to the text. There is a kind of pragmatic truth of the dramatic work30 that is 
being continuously produced through the reflective equilibrium between play and 
performance. Any lack of consensus regarding a given production (“should Kundry die 
or not?”) marks the present limits of a dramatic work and its pragmatically built 
ontology. 
The question whether Kundry should live or die becomes then salient in the 
mind of the spectator and judged against Wagner’s initial prescriptions, the history of this 
opera’s production in the last 133 years, and our own history of versions of that opera. 
This questioning, I take it, is a way through which Parsifal becomes an opera for our time.    
 
  																																																								
30 Cf. Kidnie, 2009:  
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